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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a nonmonotonic framework
for belief revision in which reasoning about the relia-
bility of different pieces of information based on meta-
knowledge about the information is possible, and where
revision strategies can be described declaratively. The
approach is based on a Poole-style system for default
reasoning in which entrenchment information is rep-
resented in the logical language. A notion of inference
based on the least fixed point of a monotone operator is
used to make sure that all theories possess a consistent
set of conclusions.
Introduction
Formal models of belief revision differ in what they con-
sider as representations of the epistemic states of an
agent. In the AGM approach (Ga¨rdenfors 1988) epis-
temic states are identified with logical theories, that is,
sets of formulas closed under classical inference. Other
approaches like those discussed in (Nebel 1992) consider
finite sets of formulas, sometimes called belief bases, as
epistemic states. They investigate how to revise such
belief bases. Only a rather small fraction of work in
belief revision has studied an obvious alternative: the
revision of epistemic states expressed as nonmonotonic
theories (Brewka 1991; Williams & Antoniou 1998;
Antoniou et al. 1999; Chopra & Parikh 1999).
This is somewhat surprising since close relationships
between properties of nonmonotonic inference relations
and postulates for belief revision have been established
(Makinson & Ga¨rdenfors 1991; Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson
1994). Indeed, one of the reasons why nonmonotonic
logics were invented is their ability to handle conflicts
and inconsistencies, one of the major issues in belief
revision. If this is the case, shouldn’t it be possible
to use the power of nonmonotonic inference to simplify
revision? In fact, what we have in mind is a complete
trivialization of the revision problem. We want to be
able to revise nonmonotonic theories simply by adding
new information, and we want to leave everything else
to the nonmonotonic inference relation.
An early approach in this spirit was the author’s pa-
per (Brewka 1991) where an extension of Poole-systems
(Poole 1988), the so-called preferred subtheory ap-
proach, was used. New information, possibly equipped
with information about the reliability level of this in-
formation, was simply added to the available informa-
tion. The nonmonotonic inference relation determined
the acceptable beliefs.
We are not satisfied with this approach any longer
for several reasons. Existing theories of belief revision,
including the one presented in the earlier paper, have
difficulties to model the way real agents revise their be-
liefs. One of the reasons for this is that they do not rep-
resent information which is commonly used by agents
for this purpose. For instance, new information always
comes together with certain meta-information (formu-
las don’t fly into the agent’s mind): Where does the
information come from? Was it an observation? Did
you read it in the newspaper? Did someone tell you,
and if so, who? Did the person who gave you the infor-
mation have a motive to lie? and so on. In most cases
we reason with and about this meta-information when
revising our beliefs. We strongly believe that realistic
models of revision should provide the necessary means
to represent this kind of information.
The meta-information is used to determine the en-
trenchment of pieces of information. The less en-
trenched the information is, the more willing we are
to give it up. Again, entrechment relations are not
just there, they result from reasoning processes. To
model this kind of reasoning, entrenchment should be
expressible in the logical language. Once we have the
possibility to express entrenchment (or plausibility, or
preference) in the language, it will also become possi-
ble to represent revision strategies declaratively. This
in turn makes it possible to revise the revision strategies
themselves.
Here is a real life example that can be used to illus-
trate what we have in mind. Assume Peter tells you
that your girl-friend Anne went out for dinner with an-
other man yesterday. Peter even knows his name: it
was John, a highly attractive person known for having
numerous affairs. You are concerned and talk to Anne
about this. She tells you she was at home yesterday
evening waiting for you to call. Peter insists that he
saw Anne with that man. You are not sure what to be-
lieve. Luckily, you find out that Anne has a twin sister
Mary. Mary indeed went out with her new boy-friend
John. This explains why Peter got mixed up. You now
believe Anne and happily continue your relationship.
What this example nicely illustrates is the way we
reason about the reliability of information. There is
no given fixed entrenchment ordering to start with. In
the example there is also, at least in the beginning, no
reason to trust Peter more than the girl-friend, or vice
versa. And obviously, it is not the new information
that is accepted in each situation. It is the additional
context information which is relevant here: it gives us
an explanation for Peter’s mistake and decreases the
reliability of Peter’s observation enough to break the
tie.
To be able to formalize examples of this kind we pro-
pose in this paper an approach to belief revision where
• nonmonotonic belief bases represent epistemic states
and nonmonotonic inference is used to completely
trivialize revision,
• it is possible to express and reason about meta-
information, including the reliability of formulas,
• revision strategies can be represented declaratively,
that is, logical formulas express how conflicts among
different pieces of information are resolved.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next
section we introduce the nonmonotonic formalism we
use here to represent epistemic states. In the following
section we show how to use this formalism for repre-
senting revision strategies. We then discuss the AGM
postulates for revision and show that almost all of them
are not valid in our approach (which does not bother
us). In the following section we briefly deal with con-
traction. We then discuss forgetting in the context of
our approach. Finally, we discuss related work and con-
clude.
Representing reliability relations
In this section we introduce the formalism used in this
paper. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the
distinguishing features of our approach is that we want
to be able to reason about the reliability of the avail-
able information in the logical language. In the AGM
approach (Ga¨rdenfors 1988; Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson
1988) entrenchment relations are used to represent how
strongly an agent sticks to his beliefs: the more en-
trenched a formula, the less willing to give it up the
agent is. Entrenchment relations have several proper-
ties which are based on the logical strength of the for-
mulas. For instance, logically weaker formulas are not
less entrenched than logically stronger ones. The intu-
ition is that if a weaker formula has to be given up, the
stronger formula has to be given up anyway.
In our approach we do not require such properties.
We may even have equivalent formulas p and p′ with
different reliability. This may happen when, for in-
stance, p and p′ come from different sources s and s′
with different reliability. Note that although the less
reliable information does not add to the accepted be-
liefs as long as the more reliable equivalent information
is in force, the situation may change when new infor-
mation about the reliability of s is obtained. Should
s turn out to be highly unreliable later (of course, be-
liefs about the reliability of sources may be revised as
any other beliefs) then it becomes important to have p′
with, say, somewhat lower reliability available.
All we require, therefore, is the existence of a strict
partial order ≺ between formulas which tells us how to
resolve potential conflicts. To avoid misunderstandings
we will not call≺ an entrenchment relation. Instead, we
speak of reliability, or simply priority among formulas.
Since we want to represent ≺ in the logical language
we need to be able to refer to formulas. Instead of
using a quoting mechanism for this purpose, we will use
named formulas, that is pairs consisting of a formula
and a name for the formula. Technically, names are
just ground terms that can be used everywhere in the
language.
We will present our formalism in two steps: we first
introduce an extension of Poole systems which allows
us to express preference information in the language,
together with an appropriate definition of extensions.
It turns out that due to the potential self-referentiality
of preference information not all theories expressed in
this formalism possess extensions, that is, acceptable
sets of beliefs. In a second step, we therefore introduce
a new notion of prioritized inference defined as the least
fixed point of a monotone operator. Epistemic states,
then, are identified with preferential default theories
under this least fixed point semantics.
Our basic formalism extends the well-known Poole
systems (Poole 1988). Recall that Poole systems con-
sist of a consistent set of (first order) formulas F , the
facts, and a possibly inconsistent set of formulas D,
the defaults. A set of formulas E is an extension of a
Poole-system (F,D) iff E = Th(F ∪D′) where D′ is a
maximal F -consistent subset of D.
Our formalism differs from this approach in the fol-
lowing respects:
1. In the context of belief revision it seems inappropriate
to consider some information as absolutely certain
and unrevisable. We therefore do not use F . Instead,
we have a single set T containing all the information.1
2. We represent preference and other meta-information
in the language. We therefore introduce names for
formulas and a special symbol <. d < d′ intuitively
says that in case of a conflict d′ should be given up
1One of the reviewers of this paper points out that using
F may have representational advantages since it eliminates
the need to use preferences to indicate the most reliable in-
formation, see our examples in the rest of the paper. We
might therefore reintroduce F in future versions of this pa-
per for purely practical reasons. This does not seem to pose
any technical problems.
rather than d since the latter is more reliable. We
require that < represents a strict partial order.2
3. We introduce a new notion of extension which takes
the preference information into account adequately.
To avoid confusion we want to emphasize that < be-
longs to the logical language, whereas ≺ is a meta level
symbol. For the following definitions it is essential to
clearly separate between these levels.
For simplicity, we only consider finite default theories
in this paper. A generalization to the infinite case would
have to reduce partial orderings to well-orderings rather
than total orders.
Definition 1 A named formula is a structure of the
form d:p, where p is a first order formula and d a ground
term representing the name of the formula.
We use the functions name and form to extract the
name respectively formula of a named formula, that
is name(d:p) = d and form(d:p) = p. We will also
apply both functions to sets of named formulas with
the obvious meaning.
Definition 2 A preference default theory T is a finite
set of named formulas such that
• form(T ) is a set of first order formulas whose logical
language contains a reserved symbol < representing a
strict total order, and
• d1:p ∈ T , d2:q ∈ T and p 6= q implies d1 6= d2.
The last item in the definition guarantees that different
formulas have different names.
Definition 3 Let T be a preference default theory, ≺
a total order on T . The extension of T generated by ≺,
denoted E≺T , is the set E
≺
T = Th(
⋃|T |
i=0 Ei) where
• E0 = ∅, and for 0 < i ≤ |T |
• Ei = Ei−1∪{form(di)} if this set is consistent, Ei−1
otherwise.
Here di is the i-th element of T according to the total
order ≺.
The set
⋃|T |
i=0 Ei is called the extension base of E
≺
T .
We say E is an extension of T if there is some total
order ≺ such that E = E≺T . Obviously, all maximal
consistent subsets of form(T ) are extension bases. We
now consider the general case of partial orders.
Definition 4 Let T be a preference default theory, ≺
a strict partial order on T . The set of extensions of T
generated by ≺ is
Ext≺T = {E
≺′
T | ≺
′ is a total order extending ≺}.
We next define two notions of compatibility:
2We assume that the properties of <, like those of equal-
ity, are part of the underlying logic and need not be repre-
sented through explicit axioms in our default theories.
Definition 5 Let T be a preference default theory, ≺
a strict partial ordering of T , S a set of formulas. We
say ≺ is compatible with S iff
S ∪ {d < d′ | d:p ≺ d′:q} ∪ {¬(d < d′) | d:p 6≺ d′:q}
is consistent.
An extension E of T is compatible with S iff there is
a strict partial ordering ≺ of T compatible with S such
that E ∈ Ext≺T .
The set of extensions of T compatible with S is denoted
ExtST .
Definition 6 Let T be a preference default theory. A
set of formulas E is called a preferred extension of T
iff E ∈ ExtET .
Intuitively, E is a preferred extension if it is the deduc-
tive closure of a maximal consistent subset of T which
can be generated through a total preference ordering
compatible with the preference information in E itself.
The preference information in E certainly does not have
to be total.
Here is a simple example illustrating preference de-
fault theories:
d1(x) : bird(x)→ flies(x) | x ground object term
d2 : ∀x.penguin(x)→ ¬flies(x)
d3 : bird(tweety) ∧ penguin(tweety)
d4 : ∀x.d3 < d1(x)
d5 : ∀x.d2 < d1(x)
As is common in Poole systems, rules with exceptions,
that is, formulas whose instances can be defeated with-
out defeating the formula as a whole (here d1), are rep-
resented as schemata used as abbreviations for all of
their ground instances. As above we will make the in-
tended instances explicit in all examples. To make sure
that the different ground instances can be distinguished
by name we have to parameterize the names also. We
assume that terms used as names can be distinguished
from other terms which we call object terms.3 In our
case, d1(tweety) is a proper rule name, d1(d1) is not.
Since we only consider finite theories we must also as-
sume that the set of object terms is finite.
In our example we obtain 3 extensionsE1, E2 and E3.
In E1 the instance of d1(x) with x = tweety is rejected,
in E2 d2 is rejected, and E3 rejects d3. All extensions
contain d4 and d5. It is not difficult to see that only E1
can be constructed using a total ordering of T which is
compatible with this information. E1 is thus the single
preferred extension of this preference default theory.
Preference default theories under extension semantics
are very flexible and expressive. The reason we are not
yet fully satisfied with them is that they can express
unsatisfiable preference information: there are theories
which do not possess any preferred extensions. The
simplest example is as follows:
3A more elaborate formalization would be based on
sorted logic with sorts for names and other types of ob-
jects from the beginning. We do not pursue this here since
we want to keep things as simple as possible.
d1 : d2 < d1
d2 : d1 < d2
Accepting the first of the two contradictory formulas
requires to give preference to the second, and vice versa.
No preferred extension exists for this theory.
This means that preference default theories together
with the standard notion of nonmonotonic inference
where a formula is considered derivable whenever it is
contained in all (preferred) extensions do not seem fully
adequate for representing epistemic states of rational
agents.
We will therefore introduce another, somewhat less
standard notion of nonmonotonic consequence.4 This
approach shares some intuition with the fixed point for-
mulation of well-founded semantics for logic programs
with negation due to Baral and Subrahmanian (Baral
& Subrahmanian 1991). In particular, it is based on
the least fixed point of a monotone operator.
Let us first explain the underlying idea. Starting with
the empty set, we iteratively compute the intersection
of those extensions which are compatible with the in-
formation obtained so far. Since the set of formulas
computed in each step may contain new preference in-
formation the number of extensions may be reduced,
and their intersection thus may grow. We continue like
this until no further change happens, that is, until a
fixed point is reached.
Definition 7 Let T be a preference default theory, S a
set of formulas. We define an operator CT as follows:
CT (S) =
⋂
ExtST
Proposition 1 The operator CT is monotone.
Proof: S ⊆ S′ implies that an ordering ≺ is compati-
ble with S whenever it is compatible with S′. We thus
have ExtS
′
T ⊆ Ext
S
T and therefore
⋂
ExtST ⊆
⋂
ExtS
′
T .
✷
Monotone operators, according to the well-known
Knaster-Tarski theorem (Tarski 1955), possess a least
fixed point. This fixed point can be computed by iter-
ating the operator on the empty set. We, therefore, can
define the accepted conclusions of a preference default
theory as follows:
Definition 8 Let T be a preference default theory. A
formula p is an accepted conclusion of T iff p ∈ lfp(CT ),
where lfp(CT ) is the least fixed point of the operator CT .
We call extensions which are compatible with lfp(CT )
accepted extensions.
4An alternative way of handling this problem would be
to introduce some kind of “stratification” into our theories.
Stratification, a term taken form the area of logic program-
ming, would prohibit formulas from speaking, directly or
indirectly, about their own priority. Unfortunately, it turns
out that only highly restrictive forms of stratification guar-
antee existence of extensions. For this reason we do not
pursue this approach here.
Several illustrative examples will be given in the next
section. Here we just show how the theory without pre-
ferred extension is handled in this approach. We have
T = {d1:(d2 < d1), d2:(d1 < d2)}. We first compute
CT (∅). Since no preference information is available in
the empty set we obtain Th({d2 < d1})∩Th({d1 < d2})
which is equivalent to Th({d2 < d1 ∨ d1 < d2}). This
set is already the least fixed point.
Proposition 2 Let T be a preference default theory, p
an accepted conclusion of T . Then p is contained in all
preferred extensions of T .
Proof: If T has no preferred extension the proposition
is trivially true. So assume T possesses preferred exten-
sion(s). A simple induction shows that each preferred
extension is among the extensions compatible with the
formulas computed in each step of the iteration of CT .
Therefore each preferred extension is also an accepted
extension. ✷
Proposition 3 Let T be a preference default theory.
The set of accepted conclusions of T is consistent.
Proof: We show by induction that, for arbitrary n,
the set of formulas obtained after n applications of CT
is consistent. For n = 0 this is trivial. Assume the set of
formulas S obtained after n− 1 iterations is consistent.
Since S is consistent and < formalizes a strict partial
ordering there must be at least one strict partial order-
ing ≺ compatible with S, so the set of all extensions
compatible with S is nonempty. Since each extension is
by definition consistent the intersection of an arbitrary
nonempty set of extensions must also be consistent. ✷
Since preference default theories under accepted con-
clusion semantics always lead to consistent beliefs, we
will in the next section identify epistemic states with
preference default theories and belief sets with their ac-
cepted conclusions.
Revising epistemic states
The revision operator
Given an agent’s epistemic state is identified with a
preference default theory as introduced in the last sec-
tion, it is natural to identify the set of beliefs accepted
by the agent with the accepted conclusions of this the-
ory. We therefore define belief sets as follows:
Definition 9 Let T be an epistemic state. Bel(T ), the
belief set induced by T , is the set of accepted conclusions
of T .
It is a basic assumption of our approach that belief sets
cannot be revised directly. Revision of belief sets is
always indirect, through the revision of the epistemic
state inducing the belief set. Note that since two differ-
ent epistemic states may induce the same belief set, the
revision function which takes an epistemic state and a
formula and produces a new epistemic state does not
induce a corresponding function on belief sets.
Given an epistemic state T , revising it with new in-
formation simply means generating a new name for it
and adding the corresponding named formula.
Definition 10 Let T be an epistemic state, p a for-
mula. The revision of T with p, denoted T ∗p, is the
epistemic state (T ∪ {n:p}) where n is a new name not
appearing in T .
Notation: in the rest of the paper we assume that names
are of the form dj where j is a numbering of the formu-
las. If T has j elements and a new formula is added,
then its new name is dj+1.
Representing revision strategies
In this subsection we show how revision strategies used
by an agent can be represented in our approach. We
first discuss an example where the strategy is based
on the type of the available information. We distin-
guish between strict rules, observations and defaults.
Strict rules have highest priority because they represent
well-established or terminological information. Obser-
vations can be wrong, but they are considered more re-
liable than default information. Consider the following
epistemic state T :
d1 : penguin(tweety)
d2 : ∀x.penguin(x)→ bird(x)
d3 : ∀x.penguin(x)→ ¬flies(x)
d4(x) : bird(x)→ flies(x) | x ground object term
d5 : observation(d1)
d6 : rule(d2)
d7 : rule(d3)
d8 : ∀x.default(d4(x))
d9 : ∀n, n′.rule(n) ∧ observation(n′)→ n < n′
d10 : ∀n, n′.observation(n)∧ default(n′)→ n < n′
T has 4 extensions. The corresponding extension
bases are obtained from T by leaving out d1, d2, d3,
or d4(tweety), respectively. All extensions, and thus
CT (∅), contain information stating that d4(tweety) has
lower preference than the other three formulas. There-
fore, the only extension compatible with CT (∅) is the
one generated by leaving out d4(tweety). This set is
also the least fixpoint of CT . Bel(T ) thus does not
contain flies(tweety).
The next example formalizes the revision strategy of
an agent who prefers newer information over older in-
formation and information from a more reliable source
over information from a less reliable source. In case of
a conflict between the two criteria the latter one wins.
Assume the following specific scenario: At time 10
Peter informs you that p holds. At time 11 John tells
you this is not true. Although you normally prefer later
information, you also have reason to prefer what Peter
told you since you believe Peter is more reliable than
John. Since you consider reliability of your sources even
more important than the temporal order you believe p.
Here is the formal representation of this scenario. We
use X < d where X is a finite set of names as an ab-
breviation for
∧
x∈X x < d. Note that we have to make
sure, by adding adequate preferences, that the rules
representing our revision strategy cannot be used - via
contraposition - to defeat our meta-knowldge about d1
and d2:
d1 : p
d2 : ¬p
d3 : time(d1) = 10
d4 : time(d2) = 11
d5 : source(d1) = Peter
d6 : source(d2) = John
d7 : more-rel(John, Peter)
d8(n, n
′) : more-rel(source(n), source(n′))→ n < n′
| n, n′ ∈ {d1, . . . , d7}
d9(n, n
′) : time(n) < time(n′)→ n′ < n
| n, n′ ∈ {d1, . . . , d7}
d10 : ∀n, n′. {d3, . . . , d7} < d8(n, n′) < d9(n, n′)
This preference default theory has 14 extensions
which are obtained by leaving out one of {d1, d2} and
one of {d3, d4, d5, d6, d7, d8(d1, d2), d9(d1, d2)}. All ex-
tensions contain d10. This means that after the next
iteration of the CT -operator we are left with 2 exten-
sions which are obtained by leaving out one of {d1, d2}
and d9(d1, d2). Both extensions contain the formula
d1 < d2. The next and final iteration of CT thus elim-
inates the extension containing d2. We are left with a
single extension and p is among the accepted conclu-
sions.
We next present the example from the introduction.
This time we use categories low, medium and high5
to express reliability: the reliability of a formula with
name n is rel(n). We have the following information:
d1 : date(Anne, John)
d2 : ¬date(Anne, John)
d3 : rel(d1) = medium
d4 : rel(d2) = medium
d5 : date(Mary, John)
d6 : twins(Mary,Anne)
d7 : date(Mary, John) ∧ twins(Mary,Anne)→
rel(d1) = low
d8 : ∀n, n′. rel(n) = high ∧ rel(n′) = medium→
n < n′
d9 : ∀n, n′. rel(n) = medium ∧ rel(n′) = low →
n < n′
d10 : rel(d5) = rel(d6) = rel(d7) = rel(d8) =
rel(d9) = high
d11 : rel(d3) = rel(d4) = medium
Although the agent initially considers d1 and d2 as
equally reliable, the information that Anne has a twin
sister Mary who is dating John decreases the reliability
of d1 to low. d8 and d9 say how the reliability cate-
gories are to be translated to preferences. d10 and d11
make sure that meta-information is preferred, and that
d7 can defeat d3.Taking all reliability information into
account the agent accepts ¬date(Anne, John).
5We assume uniqueness of names for the categories. Oth-
erwise the set {d3, d5, d6, d7} would be consistent and could
be used to defeat d9 which, obviously, is unintended.
Note that we do not discuss here how agents form
meta-beliefs of the kind required to represent the ex-
ample (induction, folk psychology?). We simply assume
that this information is available to the agent.
Postulates
We now discuss the postulates for revision which are
at the heart of the AGM approach (Ga¨rdenfors 1988).
Since our approach uses epistemic states rather than
deductively closed sets of formulas (belief sets) as sub-
strate of revision, some of the postulates need reformu-
lation. In particular, AGM use the expansion operator
+ in some postulates. Expansion of a belief set K with
a formula p means adding p to the belief set and clos-
ing under deduction, that is K + p = Th(K ∪ {p}).
Since epistemic states always induce consistent belief
sets the distinction between revising and expanding an
epistemic state does not seem to make much sense in
our context. We therefore translate expansion in the
following postulates to expansion of the induced belief
set.
In the following we present the AGM postulates (K*i)
in their original form together with our corresponding
reformulations (T*i). In each case K is a belief set in
the sense of AGM, T an epistemic state as defined in
this paper, A,B are formulas:
(K*1) K∗A is a belief set.
(T*1) Bel(T ∗A) is belief set.
Obviously satisfied.
(K*2) A ∈ K∗A
(T*2) A ∈ Bel(T ∗A)
Not satisfied. New information is not necessarily ac-
cepted in our approach. We see this as an advantage
since otherwise belief sets would always depend on the
order in which information was obtained.
(K*3) K∗A ⊆ K +A
(T*3) Bel(T ∗A) ⊆ Bel(T ) +A
Not satisfied. Assume we have T = {d1:p, d2:¬p}, that
is Bel(T ) is the set of tautologies. Let A = d1 < d2.
Now Bel(T ∗A) contains p which is not contained in
Bel(T ) +A.
(K*4) if ¬A 6∈ K then K +A ⊆ K∗A
(T*4) if ¬A 6∈ Bel(T ) then
Bel(T ) +A ⊆ Bel(T ∗A)
Not satisfied. It may be the case that ¬A, although
not in the belief set, is contained in one of the accepted
extensions. Adding A to the epistemic state does not
necessarily lead to a situation where this extension dis-
appears.
(K*5) K∗A ⊢ ⊥ iff ⊢ ¬A
(T*5) Bel(T ∗A) ⊢ ⊥ iff ⊢ ¬A
Not satisfied. Revising an epistemic state with logically
inconsistent information has no effect whatsoever. The
information is simply disregarded. Inconsistent belief
sets are impossible in our approach, so the right to left
implication does not hold.
(K*6) If A↔ B then K∗A = K∗B
(T*6) If A↔ B then Bel(T ∗A) = Bel(T ∗B)
Satisfied under the condition that A and B are given the
same name, or the names of A and B do not yet appear
in S. But note that logically equivalent information
may have different impact on the belief sets when dif-
ferent meta-information is available. For instance, d1:p
and d2:p may have different effects if different meta-
information about the sources of d1 and d2, respectively,
is available.
(K*7) K∗(A ∧B) ⊆ (K∗A) + B
(T*7) Bel(T ∗(A ∧B)) ⊆ Bel(T ∗A) +B
Not satisfied. Here is a counterexample. Assume we
have T = {d1:p, d2:¬p, d3:¬p}. Now let A = d1 < d2
and B = d1 < d3. Clearly, revising the epistemic state
with A ∧ B leads to a single accepted extension con-
taining p since the two conflicting formulas are less pre-
ferred. p is thus in the belief set induced by the revised
state. On the other hand, revising the epistemic state
with A leads to two extensions, one containing p, the
other ¬p. p is thus not in the belief set induced by the
new state. This does not change when we expand the
belief set with d1 < d3.
(K*8) If ¬B 6∈ K∗A then (K∗A) +B ⊆ K∗(A ∧B)
(T*8) If ¬B 6∈ Bel(T ∗A) then
Bel(T ∗A) +B ⊆ Bel(T ∗(A ∧B))
Not satisfied. This is immediate from the fact that
Bel(T ∗(A∧B)) does not necessarily contain B, that is
from the failure of (T*2).
This analysis shows that the intuitions captured by
the AGM postulates are indeed very different from
those underlying our approach.
Contraction
Contraction means making a formula underivable with-
out assuming its negation. There may be different rea-
sons for this, not all of them requiring extensions of our
framework. For instance, the reliability of a source of
a certain piece of information may be in doubt due to
extra information. In that case it may happen that a
belief p ∈ Bel(T ) is no longer in the belief set Bel(T ∗q)
for appropriate q even if ¬p 6∈ Bel(T ∗q). Such effects
are handled implicitly in our approach.
If, however, the agent may obtain information of the
kind “do not believe p” rather than “believe ¬p”, then
extra mechanisms seem necessary. In the context of
AGM-style approaches the contraction operator − can
be defined through revision on the basis of the so-called
Harper identity: K −A = (K∗¬A) ∩K. The intuition
here is that revision with ¬A removes the formulas used
to deriveA, and the intersection withK guarantees that
no new information is derived from ¬A.
This intuition can, to a certain extent, be captured
using Poole’s constraints (Poole 1988). Constraints, ba-
sically, are formulas used in the construction of maxi-
mal consistent subsets of the premises, but not used for
derivations.
To model contraction of epistemic states we must dis-
tinguish between these two types of formulas, premises
and constraints. Extension bases consist of both types
and also the compatibility of preference orderings is
checked against premises and contraints. Extensions,
however, are generated only from the premises. Con-
straints, as regular formulas, have names and may come
with meta-information, e.g., information about their re-
liability.
We do not want to go into further technical detail
here. Instead, we illustrate contraction using an ex-
ample. We indicate constraints by choosing names of
the form cj for them. Assume the epistemic state is as
follows:
d1 : peng(tweety)
d2(x) : peng(x)→ ¬flies(x)
The agent receives the information “do not believe
¬flies(tweety)”. The following constraint is added:
c1 : flies(tweety)
Note that the constraint is not necessarily preferred to
the premises. Let inst(d2) denote the set of all ground
instances of d2. We obtain three extension bases
E1 = {peng(tweety)} ∪ inst(d2)
E2 = {peng(tweety),flies(tweety)} ∪ inst(d2) \
{peng(tweety)→ ¬flies(tweety)}
E3 = {flies(tweety)} ∪ inst(d2)
Although E2 and E3 contain flies(tweety) this formula
is not in the extensions generated from these extension
bases, and for this reason not in the belief set, since it
is a constraint.
Note that constraints do not necessarily prohibit for-
mulas from being in the belief set since they may have
low reliability. For example, if we revise the epistemic
state obtained above with d1 < c1 and ∀x.d2(x) < c1
then the belief set contains ¬flies(tweety).
Although we used the Harper identity above to mo-
tivate the use of constraints for contraction, its natural
reformulation
Bel(T −A) = Bel(T ∗¬A) ∩Bel(T )
is not valid in our approach. Assume T = {d1:p, d2:¬p}.
Obviously, Bel(T ) is the set of tautologies. Now let
A = ¬(d1 < d2). We contract by adding the constraint
c1:(d1 < d2). Now the single accepted extension of the
new epistemic state and thus its belief set is Th(p), a
strict superset of Bel(T ).
Forgetting
In our approach revising a knowledge base means
adding a formula to the epistemic state. Even in the
case of contraction the epistemic state grows. For ideal
agents this may be adequate since every piece of infor-
mation, whether it contributes to the current belief set
or not, may turn out to be relevant later. However,
for agents with limited resources the expansion of the
epistemic state cannot go on forever.
This raises the question how and when pieces of in-
formation should be forgotten. What we need is some
kind of a mental garbage collection strategy. In LISP
systems garbage collection is the process of identifying
unaccessable memory space which is then made avail-
able again. In our context there is no clear distinction
between garbage and non-garbage. As mentioned be-
fore, every information may become relevant through
additional information, so it would not be reasonable
to throw away information just because it is, say, not
contained in any extension base. On the other hand,
even those formulas contributing to the current belief
set may be considered as garbage if the corresponding
part of the belief set is not relevant to the agent. It ap-
pears that a satisfactory treatment of forgetting would
have to take the utility of information for the agent into
account. This is beyond the scope of this paper and a
topic of further research.
Related work and discussion
In this paper we proposed a framework for belief re-
vision where preference default theories together with
a corresponding nonmonotonic inference relation are
used to represent epistemic states and belief sets, re-
spectively. Our underlying formalism draws upon ideas
developed in (Brewka 1989) and (Brewka & Eiter 2000),
the notion of accepted conclusions introduced to guar-
antee consistency of belief sets and its application to
belief revision is new. The framework is expressive
enough to represent and reason about reliability and
other properties of information. It thus can be used
to represent revision strategies of agents declaratively.
Another advantage of the framework is that it lends
itself to iteration in an obvious and natural way.
In an earlier paper (Brewka 1991) the author used
nonmonotonic belief bases in the preferred subtheo-
ries framework to model revision. This approach, how-
ever, did not represent reliability information explicitly.
Williams and Antoniou (Williams & Antoniou 1998) in-
vestigated revision of Reiter default theories. In a simi-
lar spirit, Antoniou et al (Antoniou et al. 1999) discuss
revision of theories expressed in Nute’s defeasible logic.
Also these approaches do not reason about the reliabil-
ity of information. This is also true for existing work
in revising logic programs, see (Alferes & Pereira 1996)
for an example.
Forms of revision where new information is not neces-
sarily accepted were investigated by Hansson (Hansson
1997). This form of revision is sometimes referred to
as non-prioritized belief revision. Hansson called his
version ”semi-revision”. Explicit reasoning about the
available information is not modelled in Hansson’s ap-
proach.
Structured belief bases were investigated by Wasser-
mann (Wassermann 1998). Rather than using the
structure to model meta-level and preference informa-
tion, Wassermann uses structure to determine relevant
parts of the belief base. The focus is thus on local revi-
sion operations and related complexity issues. Chopra
and Parikh (Chopra & Parikh 1999) propose a model
where belief bases are partitioned into subbases accord-
ing to syntactic criteria. Belnap’s four-valued logic is
used for query answering. Again the focus is on keeping
the effects of revision as local as possible. It is assumed
that the local revision operators used satisfy the AGM
postulates. The approach is thus very different from
ours.
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